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In The SUPREME COURT
Of The STATE Of UTAH
H,1

THE
!,:STATE

MATTER
OF

OF

THE

DALLAS

BED-

HHlD LEWIS, ALSO KNOWN

AS U. H. LEWIS, DECEASED.
LUCILLE PARKER, JACK HEIDT
a id HOBERT GASTON,
Appellants,
vs.
ERNEST L. LEWIS,
Respondent.

Case No.
10719

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
INTRODUCTORY
A pµellants herein have appealed the Order of the Dis1.i-ict Court of Millard County appointing respondent as
Aclm!!iistrator with Will Annexed in ancillary adminstrat1oi1 proceedings of the estate of Dallas Bedford Lewis.
kespondent hereby defends his appointment and seeks to
lu' 1: l he Order of the lower Court affirmed.
THE

RECORD

For convenience and simplicity, the same classificatiuns ::1rnl designations as used in Appellants' Brief will be
u,,,~,1 herP in referring to the record on appeal:
(a) The
P!eadinµs file, pages numbered 1 through 11, and 98
t lire ugh l 11. with Exhibits 1, 3 and 4 atta:·hed, here desig:1:\ted :1s "H.";
(b) The so-called Original File, which is
the l''i!J\" of the will and probate thereof authenticated by
the C'alilrn nic:i Court, pages numbered 12 thrcugh 97, here
1 10c.;i~~naft.·d as '"Of."; and ( c) The Reporter's Transcript,
P<l'!Ps numbered 1 through 130, here designated as "Tr."
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ST A TEMENT

OF FACTS

In most respects, the Statement of Facts contained in
Appellants' Brief is fairly accurate; however, respondent's
view of the facts differs from appellants' in some respects.
Respondent disagrees with the statement on page 3 of Appellants' Brief that the will named the appellants to perform certain duties and enjoy certain powers in connection
with the administration of the decedent's estate, but contends that the will names the appellants as trustees whose
duties and powers are to commence after the administration, strictly speaking, of decedent's estate has been completed. (Of. 33)
To the second paragraph on page 5 of Appellants'
Brief should be added the information that the testator and
his attorney, during the life-time of the testator, both
knew and approved of Ernest L. Lewis re~eiving a payment of $24,000.00 from the Neales in connection with
the exercise of the option mentioned. It should also be noted that the transaction was arranged at the instigation of
the testator and was complete except for formalities before his death. (Tr. 107-8, 111-12)
In the following paragraph, the statement is made
several times that the Food Company funds have been used
in connection with the Sulphurdale properties. This statement is inaccurate. D. B. Lewis invested his personal
funds into the Sulphurdale venture. The personal funds
may have been his income from the Food Company but
were nevertheless his personal funds. The executors in
California. after they were appointed, determined to lend
monies from the Food Company to pay expenses in connection with the venture, such monies to be repaid by the
D. B. Lewis Estate. (Tr. 32) It is also to be noted that
the expense allowance of Ernest L. Lewis from Lewis Food
Company is made in connection with services rendered as
Utah sales manager for the Fcod Company itself. (Tr. 53)
The Appellants' Brief states on page 6 that the "only"

nit:·ans of paying the cost of maintaining the joint venture
property is with monies from the Food Company. This is
an 1111 warranted conclusion. There are many potential
~'uurces of funds to pay such costs, but the Food Company
j,; probably the most convenient source; hence it has been
'.'cle(te<l. (Tr. 121)
In the final paragraph on page 6 of Appellants' Brief
it is stated that the petitioner (Ernest L. Lewis) did not
present with his petition a copy of the will and the prouate thereof duly authenticated as "required" by the provisions of Section 75-3-23, U.C.A. 1953. This statement is
based on the false premise that the provisions of the code
make such a requirement. Perusal of the Code Section ref erred to reveals that the language is permissive, net mandatory.
Significant facts omitted from Appellants' StatEment
arc that Ernest L. Lewis was induced by D. B. Lewis to
leave a profitable automobile business in Texas and come
to lltah to take charge of the Sulphurdale property and
had managed the testator's property in Utah since it was
first acquired, a period of about five years. (Tr. 78, 123)
and that he was in California at the time the testator cliecl
ancl for several weeks thereafter. He made numerous attempts to talk with the persons who were appointed as executors by the California Court about the property in Utah,
Lut they were unavailable to him. They did not seek information from him about the property or as to what legal
cnnnsel his brother had been using in Utah. (Tr. 29, 31,
8G, 108) The appellants showed very little interest in the
Ltah property until after Ernest L. Lewis informed them
that he had filed a petition for ancillary administration in
Utah. (Tr. 13) And even on the date hearing was held
in Utah. July 6, 196G, little or nothing had been done about
prulJate proceedings in the States of Idaho and Oregon
\\'here the testator also had property interests. (Tr. 13)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
APPELLANTS WERE NOT NAMED AS EXECUTORS IN THE WILL OF DECEDENT.
(a) The Order of The California Court Appointing Appellants as Executors Applies Only to
the Portion of the Estate in California.
Appellants cite considerable authority tending to show
that the order of a Court admitting a will ito probate is
binding on all persons having Notice of the proceeding
and also must be given full faith and credit by other states.
Utah has a statute to this effect. Respondent is in full
agreement with the authorities cited.
However, to attempt to use this line of argument and
the authorities cited to show that the appointment of executors of an estate in California is binding upon a Utah
Court for ancillary aciministration of the estate in Utah
is to display a surprising lack of understanding of the
fundamental nature of administration proceedings. Administration proceedings are in rem, not in personam.
Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 522; Bancroft,
PYobate Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 40. As proceedings
in rem, they have effect on things, the things being the
properties of an estate. And it is elementary that the
Courts of any state have no jurisJiction over propErties
beyond their boundaries. Bancroft, Prnbate Practice, 2nd
Ed., Vol. 4, Sec. 1227. For this reason, ancillary administration proceedings become necessary when a decedent
owned property locatecl in more than one state. But the
ancillary administration proceeding is not a part of the
domiciliary administration. Bancroft, Probate Practice,
2nd Ed., Vol. 4, Sec. 1222 states:

5
Ancillary administration is accordingly not to
be regarded as subsidiary, but rather as an independent administration, limited in effect to property physically within the jurisdiction, and directed
primarily to the protection of local creditors of the
decedent.
Ordinarily there is not even privity between ancillary and domestic representatives.
This principle is elaborated in 21 American Jurisprudence 848 et seq.:
Although it has been said that an ancillary ad·
ministrator is in some respects the deputy or agent
of the domiciliary representative, it must be borne
in mind that he receives his authority, not from the
executor, but under a different law, that he administers the estate which comes to his hands under a
different law from, and perhaps conflicting with
the law of the domicile, and that he is not answerable for his conduct to the domiciliary representative ... (A) lthough a domiciliary and ancillary representative are in privity with the decedent, there is
no privity between themselves. . . It is an elementary principle that letters testimentary or of administration have no legal force or effect beyond the
territorial limits of the state in which they are
granted. . . ( S) ince an ancillary administrator derives his authority from the laws of the state of his
appointment, he is concerned with and has authority to collect the debts, receive the assets situated in
the state where the administration is granted.
If the law were not as stated above, the sovereignty
of the several states would be seriously infringed. Orders
made by Courts of one state could have effects on property
located in other states. But the law is that administrati011
uf an estate in California is subject to the California
Conrts ancl ac1ministration of an estate in Utah is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts. The only
limitation on the c<·mplete sovereignty of the Courts of th<!
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va1·ious states in probate proceedings is that a will which
has been found to be valid in the state where it was executed must be recognized as valid in other states. This principle has been specifically enacted into law in this state in
Section 75-3-24, U.C.A. 1953:
75-3-24. Hearing and Proof. - If on the hearing it appears on the face of the record that the
will has been proved, allowed and admitted to probate in any other state or territory of the United
States, or in any foreign country, and that it was
executed according to the law of the place in which
the same was made, or in which the testator was at
the time domiciled, or in conformity with the laws
of this state, it must be admitted to probate and
shall have the same force and effect as a will first
admitted to probate in this state, and letters testimentary or of administration shall issue thereon.
Beyond recognizing the probate of a will in another state
or in a foreign country, the statute cited in no way indicates that any reeognition is to be given to any furthei·
orders of the foreign Court with respect to the administration of the estate.
Respondent does not here collaterally attack the Order of the California Court. He is concerned only with
the administration pro~eeding in Utah. This is a separate
proceeding under jurisdiction of the Courts of a different
sovereign state. The order of the lower Court in this 'State
did not in effect strike down the order of the California
Court. It had no effect on it. The executors appointed in
California are still executors in California. But the lower
Court in Utah properly determined that the administration of the portion of the estate located in Utah was within its jurisdiction and has proceeded accordingly.
(b) Utah Courts Must Determine Who Is Entitled to
Administer an Estate in Utah.
Appellants cite several sections of the Utah Code to
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:-il:mv that 1.hP property of this estate should be deemed as
personal pruperty and therefore is controlled by the law of
the domicile. Respondent does not disagree. But appellants' argument is not material to this case. In the first
place, the matter now before the Court is not a determination about the disposition of property, real or personal, bu~
a determination as to the selection of a personal representative of the estate. The law pertaining to a determination
of this sort is succinctly stated in 33 Corpus Juris Secundum 923, Sec. 31:
The law of the place where the estate is to be
administered, and not the law of the domocile of the
decedent, governs in who is entitled to administer.
Even if the argument of appellants were material, the
law of the domiciliary state is presumed to be the same as
the law of this state unless proven otherwise. Jn re Campbell's Estate, 53 Utah 487, 173 Pac. 688. And no proof
has been made that the law in California differs in any resped from the law in Utah. Moreover, this Court has al··
ready been confronted with the type of argument now propounded by appellants, in the case of In Re Campbell's Esto tc, s11p1 o, and its ruling ought to settle the issue:
The contention that the Courts of this state are
precluded from construing the will because the
Courts of California, where the domiciliary administration is had, may place a construction thereon
different than given it by the Courts of this state,
is whollv without merit. No authorities are cited,
nor do we think any can be found, that support
counsel's contention in that regard.
The general rule, as declared by practically all
of the authorities on the subject, is that the law
of the testator's domicile governs the construction
of his will disposing of personalty, and that Courts
exercising ancillary powers should be governed .by
th is rule in construing wills, unless a construct10n
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of the law of the testator's domicile contravenes the
law of the state where the will is offered for probate . . . Furthermore, we have a statute declaratory of this general rule which is as follows:
(The Court cites the Section which is now Utah
Code Annotated 1953, 74-3-21.)
It will be noticed that this section in plain and
unmistakable terms provides that the "interpretation" of wills shall be governed, when relating to
personal property, by the law of testator's domicile,
and not, as counsel's argument seems to imply, by
the interpretation given wills by the Courts of a
sister state where the domiciliary administration is
had.

While the interpretation of a will under these
circumstances by the Courts of some other state
should, and would, be given much weight by the
Courts of this state, such interpretation nevertheless would not be binding.
After making the above statement of law, this Court
proceeded to determine a matter involving personal property of an estate in which there was an ancillary administration in Utah and a domiciliary admin~stration in
California in direct contravention of a ruling already made
by a California Court - - giving considertion to the law of
California, but refusing to be bound by the decision of the
California Court. Surely appellants' contention that the
Utah Court in this case is bound by the Order of the California Court in the proceeding held there is not to be
taken seriously.
(c)

The Will Names No Executors.

Though it is preferable both for the protection of the
citizens of a state where ancillary administration is had
and fer the benefit o.f the estate that a resident of the state
of ancillary arlministration be appointed to administer the
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estate, appellants correctly contend that where persons are
named in a will as executors, their non-residence does not
disqualify them for appointment in the State of Utah. On
the other hand, if they are not named in the will as executors, their appointment is expressly prohibited by Section
75-4-4, U.C.A. 1953:
No person is competent or entitled to serve a8
administrator or administratrix who is either:
( 2) Not a bona fide resident of the state ....
The foregoing section of the Utah Code should be applied in the light of: First, what will best serve and protect the citizens of Utah? and, second, what is best for the
estate? It is the Utah Court's duty to determine whether
or not the will named executors, and if there is a doubt,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of having a personal
representative on the spot in Utah, available to demands
of creditors and persons having an interest in or claim
upon the property which is situated in this state. This doctrine is set forth in 33 Corpus Juris Se~ undum 906, Sec. 22,
as followR:
(I) t may be stated generally that the appointment
of executors by construction or implication from the
terms of the will should not be favored, but ir.
doubtful cases administration with will annexed
should be resorted to.

The will of this decedent names no executors. It
names certain persons as "trustees", but it is not proper
to infer from the will that the testator intended these persons to be executors. It was held in Estate of Clary, 98
Cal. 2d 52 !, 220 Pac. 2d 754 that:
1

Unless the Court can conclude from the words of
the testator that the latter intended for his devisee
to take charge of the estate, collect his assets, pay
his debts, and perform the usual functions of an
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executor, it is error to appoint such devisee.
A good deal of stretching and reading between the lines
is necessary to conclude from this decedent's will that the
appellants herein were intended to perform the functions
of executors. Rather, the testator was obviously doing
some relatively long range planning. Ineptly, but nevertheless quite certainly, the testator manifests his desire
that his property be distributed to trustees of numerous
trusts, charging the trustees to use the properties and
monies placed in their custody to carry out various terms
and wishes which were dictated into the will. Appellants
have in their Brief quoted a paragraph from page 14 of
the will in which trustees are named. It is appropriate
that the succeeding two paragraphs of the will also be
quoted and called to the attention of the Court:
Throughout this will I have instructed tha'.
Security First National Bank be used as Co-Trui,;tee; however, my Trustees shall have the right t0
change banks to any other responsible bank as CoTrustee should they for any reason feel that th.c
Security First National Bank is not satisfa torr
due to too high fees or any other reasons, with C'l'
without cause. The head of the Trustees shall be
Lucille Casso-Parker and the Trusteeship shall operate on a majority rule until such time as John Raymond Lewis, as specified heretofore, becomes of age
and shall become chairman of the Trustees, and
when he reaches age thirty the Trusteeship shall be
disbanded and he shall become the sole authority
with the above instructions in effect.
During the existence of this Trusteeship, the
Trustees involved shall be paid a reasonable compensation for their efforts and ti.me devoted to the
execution and carrying out to the best of their ability the wishes that have been dictated into this will.
(Of. 33)

It is to be noted that Lucille Parker is apparentl:v to
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Lw replaced as a trustee by John Raymond Lewis, who is

presently a young boy of about twelve years of age, when
he Lecomes of age and that the trusteeship is to endure until he reaches the age of thirty years. The testator does
tl!!t appear to be talking about the winding up of his aff<Jirn and the settlement and distribution of his estate, but
rather about the carrying on of his business and using the
earnings to carry out certain wishes which he expressed
in the will. It is not likely that the testator intended his
estate to remain in administration for a period of eighteen
years.
Appellants cite several sections of the Utah Code pertaining to interpretation of wills. An additional section
which is even more pertinent to this matter is Section
74-2-5, U.C.A. 1953:
7 4-2-5. All Parts To Be Harmonized, If Possible.
All the parts of a will are to be construed in relation
to each other, and, if possible, so as to form one consistent whole; but where several parts are absolutely irreconcilable, the latter must prevail.
Tht> paragraphs from the will quoted above are the
last paragraphs in the will in which the words trustee and
trusteeship are used. It is very clear in these paragraphs
that the testator was speaking of a trusteeship and not of
the administration of his estate. If earlier references to
trnstees in the will are inconsistent with the references in
these paragraphs, the references in these paragraphs
should prevail.
Since, to say the least, there is great doubt that the
lestator intended to appoint the appellants herein as the
executors of his Last Will and Testament, the finding ancl
conclusion of the lower Court that no executors were
nmnecl in the will is proper.
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POINT

II.

THE LOWER COURT HAD THE RIGHT TO USE
ITS DISCRETION IN THE APPOINTMENT OF'
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTA TE Il\
UTAH.
(a)

Appellants Failed to File Their Petition for
Letters Testamentarv Within the Time Limit
Allowed by Utah Law.

Even if the appellants had been named as executors
in the will, a Utah Court is not obligated to appoint them
to administer the portion of this estate located in Utah.
Section 75-3-4, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
If the person named in a will as executor, for thirty

days after he has knowledge of the death of the testator and that he is named as executor, fails to petion for the probate of the will and for letters testimentary, he may be held to have renounced his
rights to letters, and the Court may appoint any
other competent person administrator, unless good
cause for the delay is shown.
This Section of the Code has been applied in the cas(~
of In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 353, 285 Pac 299:
It may be conceded that, where the petition by the

party named as executor is filed in time, the Court
has no discretion but to appoint the party named
executor unless he is disqualified by statute, but
this Court has already committed itself to the doctrine that failure to make timely application for letters testimentary leaves it in the discretion of the
Court whether he appoints the person having the
preferential right or some other competent person.
Appellants contend that the holding of In re Love's
Estate, supra, is not pertinent in the case of an ancillan·
administration. But it is submitted that appellants contention is incorrect. Ban~roft, Probate Pract?'ce, 2nd Ed.,
Vol. 4, Sec. 1228, states:
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Hut statutes declaring that one named as executor renounces his preference right to letters if he
fails to apply therefor within a specified number of
days after he has knowledge of the death of the testator and that he is named as executor, apply in ancillary as well as domiciliary administration.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming in holding that a section of the Wyoming law similar to the section of Uta:1
lcnr cited applies to a foreign as well as a domestic will and
that preference is lost by delay, commented that the objed of the statute is to secure prompt settlement of estates. That Court held that after expiration of the thirty
day period, who is to be appointed to administer the est ·~c~ l;e:::c mes a matter for the sound discretion of the
Court. Rice v. Tilton, 80 Pac. 828. The purpose of the
thi1·tv day 1 mitation is, of course, for the protection of the
estate and the persons having claims against or rights under the estate. These persons ought not to be required to
:-;ubmit to la:k of diligence on the part of the persons
named in the will.
1

(b)

Appellants Failed to Show Good Cause For
Their Delay in Filing Probate Proceedings in
Utah.

Whether or not good cause for the de:ay in filing probate prneeeclings in Utah was shown is s:.1bstantially a matter of fad to he dete1mined by the lower Court -- the lower
Ccurt having the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
hearing them testify and observing their demeanor, all of
whkh must be considered along with the statements which
h~Lome part of the re_ord. The finding; of the lower Court
is as follows:
1:1. This Court finds that they did not show
good cause, or in fact any cause for such delay,
other than that they didn't feel that it was important as compared with other matters, and that they
\\ere net ci: neerned until after they were informed
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of the petition by Ernest L. Lewis. There was no
showing that they were in any way prevented from
petitioning this Court, and in fact there was testimony that Mr. Ernest L. Lewis informed one or
more of them of the urgency for action in Utah, and
that they ignored such statements and appeared to
avoid contact with Mr. Lewis. (R. 102)
The appellants contention that the Utah petition
could not be filed until the will was admitted to probate
in California is erroneous. There is no requirement fJ~·
Utah law that a will must be proved in the domiciliary
state before it can be submitted for probate in Utah. Nor
is there any requirement that the probate proceedings in
the domi _iliary state and a wpy of the will must be submitted at the time a petition is filed in Utah. As has been
previously noted, the language of the Utah statutes is permissive, and not mandatory. Conceding, though, bat
there may be justification for waiting until the will has
been admitted in the domiciliary state before filing probate proceedings in another state, the facts remain foat
the appellants did not in any way commen,e to make pn;parations for filing in Utah or even to inquire about Utah
law qr Utah counsel until after Ernest L. Lewis informed
them l:e had filed his petition. At that time they immediately became very interested in the property in Utah, but
still did nothing about the property in the States of Idaho
and Oregon, and probate in these states was still in abeyance on July 6, 1966, the date on which the hearing on this
matter was held in Utah. (Tr. 13) It is a proper inference that the appellants were spurred to action in Utah
solely by the act:on of the respondent. Prior to that time.
they had not consulted with him about the property ur
about what legal counsel his brother had used in Utah and
appeared to be avoiding him, though he made attempts to
be aYallable to them and to inform them of matters pertaining- to t~1e Utah prcpf'rty. (Tr. 86, 103)

1G
(f'.)

The Utah Court Properly Exercised Its Sound
Discretion in Appointing a Personal Representative of the Estate in Utah.

Respondent is in full accord with the contentions of
appellants that the affairs of Lewis Food Company and the
e"tate in California are of extreme importance and requil e
diligent care. They must not be neglected. These affairs
are a heavy responsibility for the appellants. Lucille Parker. a mother of four young children, has had to assume
the great responsibility of the presidency of Lewis Food
C:(Jmpany. (Tr. 49) Jack Heidt, a vice president of a bank,
i" haYing- to hear burdens in connection with this estate in
:1 !ditirm to his full time regu~ar emp:oyment. ( Tr. 24) And
Rf bert Gaston, an attorney who is subject to the demands
of a substantial law practice, also has to assume the additional demands of the D. B. Lewis estate. (Tr. 75)
With the burdens and responsibilities placed upon
them in California, the appellants are undoubtedly more
tlian busy. In addition to thiR, to take on the responsibility
of a substantial property in Utah is beyond their competence. They were unable even to initiate inquiry about the
rrquirements of Utah law before an important statutor:v
dea'.lline had e}pir2d. At least one of the appellants w;;;s
still nn;nvare that anyone was in charge of the Utah property as late as July 6, 1966. (Tr. 29)
Appf'llants make attempts to cast doubts upon the
ability of Ernest L. Lewis to administer the property by
<~sserting that at his instigation the Food Company im·
mediately following the death of decedent was induced tu
uay out $415,000.00 in purchase of the Neales' interest in
the Utah property. This was not done at the instigation
of Ernest L. Lewis, but at the instigation of D. B. Lewis
prior to his death. Ernest L. Lewis and Mr. Murchison.
Tl B. Lewis' attorney, were merely concerned about carrying cut the \Vish of the decedent to settle a lawsuit in whish
1 :1r decedent was being sued for $35,000,000.00. (Tr. 107 1

10) Until that lawsuit was settled, the whole estate, including Lewis Food Company, was in jeopardy. For thi:,;
reason, n. B. Lewis had five days prior to his death, summoned his brother, Ernest L. Lewis, to California to arrange for purchase of the Neales' interest in Sulphurdak
and thereby settle the lawsuit. The option was obtained
by Ernest L. Lewis on a Friday and D. B. Lewis died the
following Monday night. Ernest L. Lewis spent a larvr~
part of that Monday with his brother and his brother's attorney going over the papers, making copies of them, and
arranging for the transaction. (Tr. 108)
A further innuendo against Ernest L. Lewis in Appellanh;' Brief is the mention that nothing was left to him
directly under the will - - that a trust was created for
Ernest L Lev»is, his wife and his son but no responsibilit:.
whatever was placed in the hands of Ernest in connection
with the administration of the estate. In this conne tion,
it is significant that the testator died at the relative·y
young age of sixty-two years and that though Ernest L.
Lewis is a few years younger, he was experiencing a period of serious illness during the time when the testator
\ms writing- his will. (Tr. 122) Furthermore, everyone is
av:are of the inheritance tax advantages in skipping generations in disposing of propertits in wills. For these reasons, not lack of conf iden; e in Ernest L. Lewis, the decedent made his provision for Ernest L. Lewis and his other
brothers and sisters in the form of trusts for their decendents. The facts that the decedent placed Ernest L.
Lewis in charge of his property in Utah during his lifetime and entrusted him to negotiate settlement of a $35,000,000.00 lawsuit show that he did repose confidence in
him. (Tr. 107-10) The lower Court vvas fully justified ir.
finding- that Ernest L. Lewis was competent in every way
and nniquel.v qtrnlifit>'l to a<'minister the property of the
estatp in Utah.
Appellants urge that a unified administration of an
t•state of this size and complexity is preferable. But this
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Llils to take into consideration the most important reason
\\by an ancillary proceeding is required. The primary purp11se of an ancillary proceeding is to protect the citizens
and all persons who may have an interest in or claim
against the property in the state where the ancillary administration is had. It is obvious that this purpose can
best be accomplished by having a personal representative
present and residing in the state of ancillary administration. Moreover, the size and complexity of this estate
make it desirable that a local administrator be appointed
in addition to the domiciliary representatives. Appellants
are "spread too thin" to take the necessary interest in and
c:are of the Utah property. The lower Court was convinced
r,f this when it found:
All three of them displayed no particular interest
or concern in or for the Utah properties of this decedent, and none of them had much if any knowledge of the properties. It appeared to this Court
that their only interest in the Utah properties an,c>e~
after Ernest L. Lewis filed his petition herein, and
was to the effect that he should be precluded from
being so appointed. (R. 102)
Upon determining that the appointment of a personal
reprn:;entative of the estate was a matter within its discretion, the lower Court no doubt weighed the various factors just mentioned. Furthermore, the contestants had all
appeared in Court and testified and their appearance and
demeanor may have influenced the weight of their testimony. The efforts of Ernest L. Lewis in preserving the
Pstate b~· seeing that a $35,000,000.00 lawsuit was settled
acc Jn\ing to his hrother's vvishes, in taking action to sell
pr(Jperty \vhich the will dire:ted to be sold, (Tr. 87) anr.i
in 1aki1w steps to see that scmeone was appointed to act ..
minister the estate in Utah and to have authority to con1·ey the propertr if a sale should materialize, together with
l1i-; knowledge of and proximity to the property (Tr. 78)
1
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were no doubt compared with the efforts and knowledge
and availability of the appellants. Though he lives and
works only a few miles from the headquarters of Lewis
Food Company, Jack Heidt did not get around to making
a visit there from the date of D. B. Lewis' death (April
25, 1966) until June 6, 1966 (Tr. 24) and he displayed no
knowledge or understanding whatever about Sulphurdale.
(Tr. 27) Robert Gaston had managed to visit the Lewi&
Food Company headquarters twice in the two and a half
month period from the date of the testator's death till the
hearing in Utah. (Tr. 75) It appears from the record that
the general management of Lewis Food Company has been
left almost entirely in the hands of a young housewife
who had previously been working only a part of one day a
week. (Tr. 48) The lower Court did not err in exercising
its sound discretion to appoint Ernest L. Lewis to administer the estate in Utah.

CONCLUSION
The order and findings of the lower Court are justified by the facts and law. Its Order denying the petition
of appellants and allowing the petition of respondent and
appointing respondent as administrator with will annexed
for the conduct of ancillary administration proceedings
in this jurisdiction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. LEE PETERSEN
Attorney for Respondent
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